Symbols Logic Replace Disappointment Neurons Probability Augment Doomsday

Where will the Al Pendulum Swing Next?

Subbarao Kambhampati

Arizona State University



Video of the talk available at http://rakaposhi.eas.asu.edu/ai-pendulum.html

Pop Quiz: Magellan, the explorer, went around the world three times. On one of his trips, he died. Which trip did he die?

[A 3min montage video of accomplishments of AI]


What is "Intelligence" anyway?

Clearly that indefinable quality that you have and your bozo friends don't...

Magellan, the explorer, went around the world three times. On one of his trips, he died.

Question: Which trip did he die in?

Many Intelligences..



- Perceptual tasks that seem to come naturally to us
 - Form the basis for the Captchas..
 - But rarely form the basis for our own judgements about each other's intelligence
- Cognitive/reasoning tasks
 - That seem to be what we get tested in in SAT etc
- Emotional Intelligence
- Social Intelligence...










When is a computer Intelligent?

- When it does tasks that, when done by a human, would be seen as requiring intelligence..
 - Nice circular definition ©











474/598












Al's progress towards intelligence

- 80's --- Expert systems
 - Rule-based systems for many businesses
- 90's -- Reasoning systems
 - Dethroned Kasparov
- 00's: Perceptual tasks
 - Speech recognition common place!
 - Image recognition has improved significantly
- Current: Connecting reasoning and perception

Notice the contrast.. Human babies master perception before they get good at reasoning tasks!

If you want to know limits of AI, look at the Captcha's!

 Al could imitate experts earlier than it could imitate 4 year olds..







Password (required)

Birthday (required)
March <u>▼</u> 31 <u>▼</u> 1981
Human test (required)
Type in the text you see in the box below.
Sorry, your text and the image didn't match. Please try again.
Read (really!)
I have read and agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
ď

Still Elusive Commonsense

When did Magellan Die?







Symbols Logic Replace Disappointment Neurons Probability Augment Doomsday

Symbols ←→Neurons

Symbols or Neurons?


Neurons

 Clearly, brain works by neurons.



Symbols

 But, from Greeks on, human knowledge has been codified in symbolic fashion



Qn: Should AI researchers look at symbols or neurons as the substrate?

Symbols or Neurons?

 "A physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action.


--Allen Newell & Herbert Simon

 Symbols are Luminiferous Aether of AI

—Geoff Hinton







Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach

(Third edition) by Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig

AIMA Home

Al on the Web

Code

Chapters

Contents

Courses

Errata

Instructors

Search AIMA

Artificial Intelligence

A Modern Appeach

The leading textbook in Artificial Intelligence.

Used in over 1300 universities in over 110 countries.

The 22nd most cited computer science publication on Citeseer (and 4th most cited publication of this century).

What's New

Free Online AI course, Berkeley's CS 188, offered through edX.

Comments and Discussion

- · Comments from readers
- Errata list (errors in the book)
- · AIMA-talk discussion list, open to all

AI Resources on the Web

- AI On the Web, a list of over 900 links
- AI Books in many categories
- AI courses that are using AIMA (1200 schools)

Online Code Repository

- Pseudo-code algorithms from the book in pdf.
- · Online code in Lisp, Python, Java etc.
- Data for the online code
- Online demos (Java applets and Javascript)
- The OpenNERO 3D multiagent simulator

For the Instructor

- · AI Instructor's Resource Page
- Lecture slides coming soon

Table of Contents

[Full Contents]

Preface [html]

Part I Artificial Intelligence

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Intelligent Agents

Part II Problem Solving

- 3 Solving Problems by Searching
- 4 Beyond Classical Search
- 5 Adversarial Search
- 6 Constraint Satisfaction Problems

Part III Knowledge and Reasoning

- 7 Logical Agents
- 8 First-Order Logic
- 9 Inference in First-Order Logic
- 10 Classical Planning
- 11 Planning and Acting in the Real World
- 12 Knowledge Representation

Part IV Uncertain Knowledge and Reasoning

- 13 Quantifying Uncertainty
- 14 Probabilistic Reasoning
- 15 Probabilistic Reasoning over Time
- 16 Making Simple Decisions
- 17 Making Complex Decisions


Part V Learning

- 18 Learning from Examples
- 19 Knowledge in Learning
- 20 Learning Probabilistic Models
- 21 Reinforcement Learning

Part VII Communicating, Perceiving, and Acting

22 Natural Language Processing


Deep networks were in deep hibernation for most of recent past.. But clearly the pendulum swung their way now



Prediction?



- Al systems were good at reasoning tasks (the SAT stuff..) before it became good at the perception tasks (vision, language understanding etc.)
- The successes on the perception front did have a lot to do with neural architectures
 - This doesn't necessarily imply that pendulum would stay at the neural end
 - Deep learning has been good until now on non-cognitive tasks; extending their success seems to require reasoning
 - Example: Success of AlphaGo
- tldr; We might want our aether.... ☺



Google DeepMind calls the self-guided method reinforced (sic) learning, but it's really just another word for "deep learning," the current AI buzzword.

-IEEE Spectrum (!!) 1/27/16

Logic←→Probability

Does Tweety Fly?



Logic

- Bird(x) => Fly(x)
- Bird(Tweety)
- ?
- But if I tell you Tweety is an ostrich? A magical ostrich?
- Non-monotonic logic

Probability

- P(TF|TB) = 0.99
- P(TF|TB&TO) = 0.4
- P(TF|TB&TO&TMO)= 0.8
- Posterior probabilities
 - Bayes Rule
 - P(A|B)=P(B|A)*P(A)/P(B)

IN DEFENCE OF LOGIC

P.J. Hayes Essex University Colchester, U.K.

Introduction

precise language ever developed to express human thought and inference. Measured across any reasonably broad spectrum, including philosophy, linguistics, computer science, mathematics and artificial intelligence, no other formalism has been anything like so successful. And yet recent writers in the AI field have been almost unanimous in their condemnation of logic as a representational language, and other formalisms are in a state of rapid development.

I will argue that most of this criticism misses the point, and that the real contribution of logic is not its usual rather sparse syntax, but the semantic theory which it provides. All is as much in need now of good semantic theories with which to compare formalisms as it always has been I will also re-examine the procedural/declarative controversy and show how regarding representational languages as programming languages has, ironically, made procedural ideas as vulnerable to the old proceduralists' criticisms as the classical theorem-proving paradigm was. I will argue that the contrast between assertional and procedural languages is false: we have rather two kinds of subject-matter than two kinds of language.

This paper is deliberately polemical in tone. Much has been written from the proceduralist point of view. It's time the other arguments were put.

Logic is not a programming system

It will, and has been, said that to defend It will, and has been, said that to defend logic is to adopt a reactionary position. Logic has been tried (in the late sixties) and found wanting; now it has been superceded by better systems, in particular, procedural languages such as LPLANNER [17], CONNMER [18] and more recently KRL [2].


But logic is not a <u>system</u> in this sense. It's not a style of programming. It entails no commitment to the use of any particular process organis-

<u>performs</u> inferences: some of its processes are the making of inferences.
But two different systems may be based on the same notion of inference and the same representational language. The inference structure of the tional language. The inference structure of the language used by a system does not depend on the process structure. In particular, a system may have a logical inference structure - may be making deductively valid inferences - without being a classical uniform theorem-prover which just "grinds lists of clauses together".

What logic is: the extensional analysis of meaning

One of the first tasks which faces a theory of representation is to give some account of what a representation or representational language means. Without such an account, comparisons betweer representations or languages can only be very super-ficial. Logical model theory provides such an

Sunnose it is claimed that:



means that Bill hit Mary with a fish (to take a representative example), or that:

((DO(^AGENT)^BADTHING))CAUSE(^AGENT)DISPLAY (tfNEGATIVEEMOTION)))

means that people often seem upset when bad things happen (to take another). How could one judge whether they really do mean those things? What would count as a specification of their meanings? Several answers can be suggested.

Peter Cheeseman SRI International 333 Ravenswood Ave., Menlo Park, California 94025

In this paper, it is argued that probability theory, when used correctly, is suffrcient for the task of reasoning under uncertainty. Since numerous authors have rejected probability as inadequate for various reasons, the bulk of the paper is aimed at refuting these claims and indicating the scources of error. In particular, the definition of probability as a measure of belief rather than a frequency ratio is advocated, since a frequency interpretation of probability drastically restricts the domain of applicability. Other sources of error include the confusion between relative and absolute probability, the distinction between probability and the uncertainty of that probability. Also, the interaction of logic and probability is discusses and it is argued that many extensions of logic, such as "default logic" are better understood in a probabilistic framework. The main claim of this paper is that the numerous schemes for representing and reasoning about uncertainty that have appeared in the Al literature are unnecessary-probability is all that is

1 Introduction

A glance through any major Al publication shows that an overwhelming proportion of papers are concerned with what might be described as the logical approach to inference and knowledge representation. It now widely accepted that many knowledge representations can be mapped into (first order) predicate calculus, and the corresponding inference procedures can be reduced to a type of controlled logical deduction. However, examples of human reasoning (judgements) are full of such terms as "probably", "most", 'usually" etc., showing that many patterns of human reasoning are not logical in form, but intrinsically probabilistic.

The claim that many patterns of human reasoning are probabilistic does not mean that the underlying "logic" of such patterns cannot be axiomatized. On the contrary, a basis for such an axiomatization is given in section 3. The claim is that when such an exercise is performed, the resulting patterns of inference are different in form from those found in analogous logical deductions. A characteristic dif-

inference paths ("proofs") connecting the evidence to the hypothesis of interest must be examined and "combined". while in logic it is sufficient to establish a single path between the axioms and the theorem of interest. Also, the output is different, the former includes at least one numerical measure, the latter simply true or false.

Unfortunately, the logical style of reasoning is so prevalent in Al that many have attempted to force intrinsically probabilistic situations into a logical straight-lacket with predictable limited success. Two conspicuous examples of this are "Default Logic" [19] and "Non-Monotonic Logic" [15] discussed in more detail below. These methods are appropriate for dealing with some situations where limited knowledge is available. The same cannot be said for those who invent new theories for reasoning under uncertainty, such as "Certainty Factors", "Schafer/Dempster Theory", "Confirmation Theory", "Fuzzy Logic", "Endorsements"

These theories will be shown below to be at best unnecessary and at worst misleading (not to mention confusing to the poor novice faced with so many possibilities). Each one is an attempt to circumvent some perceived difficulty of probability theory, but as shown below these difficulties exist only in the minds of their inventors. However, these supposed difficulties are common misconceptions of probability, generally springing from the inadequate frequency interpretation. A major aim of this paper is to put forward the older view (Bayes, Laplace etc.), that probability is a measure of belief in a proposition given particular evidence. This definition avoids the difficulties associated with the frequency definition and answers the objections of those who felt compelled to invent new theories.

An analogy can be draw between the situation in AI in the late 1970s, where Pat Hayes, in a paper entitled *In Defence of Logic" [10], found it necessary to take a broadside at the proliferation of new representation languages (with associated inference procedures) that proported to solve difficulties with the logical approach. He showed that far from being "nonlogical" it is possible to cast such languages into an equivalent logical form, and by doing so provide a clear semantics. In addition, he pointed out the obvious but unpopular fact that logic has been around for

240 CHAPTER 12. PROBABILITY

if E splits two nodes x and y, then the probabilities to be assigned to these nodes are conditionally independent given E.

Given these definitions, the conditional independence assumptions in Given these deliminors, the control of the arcs in a plicit in influence diagrams seem to be reasonable ones—if the arcs in a diagram like that in Figure 12.1 or Figure 12.2 correspond to the cause connections in our domain, so that the color of the light can only affect our mood via the possibility of our getting a ticket, the conclusion the sanctions the derivation of (12.5) from (12.4) seems a valid one. The reson that influence diagrams are of such interest to the probabilistic community is that they provide a compact, effective, and useful way to represent the wealth of independence assumptions needed by practical probabilistic

There is another way to look at this as well. In order to evaluate all of the probabilities in the traffic example of Figure 12.1, we need to know the

for each choice of color c, ticket possibility t (yes or no; did I get a ticket or not?), mood m (good or bad), and loss of license I (yes or no). As we have already remarked, there are twenty-four of these probabilities. and they are potentially constrained only by the requirement that they

Of course, we know that we can always rewrite (12.6) as

 $pr(c) \cdot pr(t|c) \cdot pr(m|c \wedge t) \cdot pr(l|c \wedge t \wedge m)$

The conditional independence assumptions associated with the influence diagram allow us to rewrite this in the simpler form

pr(c) - pr(t|c) - pr(m|t) - pr(l|t)

Once again, only ten values are needed to evaluate the various instances of (12.7)—one probability for each color, three for the probability of getting a ticket as a function of color, and two each to give my mood and chances of losing my license depending on whether I've gotten a ticket or not.

Influence diagrams allow us to conveniently represent the condition independence assumptions used to reduce the amount of information needed by a probabilistic reasoner.

12.4 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PROBABILITY IN AI

My final aim in this chapter is to discuss the philosophical question derlying the application of probability to Al. After all, the successful experience is not necessarily evidence that probabilities have a business have a funder to the successful evidence that probabilities have a funder to the successful evidence that the s


Published 1993

IJCAI 1977

IJCAI 1985

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PROBABILITY IN AI

My final aim in this chapter is to discuss the philosophical questions underlying the application of derlying the application of probability to AI. After all, the success of PROSPECTOR is not necessarily PROSPECTOR is not necessarily evidence that probabilities have a funda-



Replace -> Augment

Al's Curious Ambivalence to humans...

- Our systems seem happiest
 - either far away from humans
 - or in an adversarial stance with humans







What happened to Co-existence?

- Whither McCarthy's advice taker?
- ..or Janet Kolodner's house wife?
- ...or even Dave's HAL?
 - (with hopefully a less sinister voice)





25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

New York City, July 9-15, 2016 www.ijcai-16.org





Conference

Gerhard Germany Program

Arizona State University, Tempe Local Arrangements Committee Chair

Ernest

New York University

IJCAI Secretary-

Bernhard

Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg I)CAI Executive Secretary.

Vienna University of Technology, Austria

Organizing Institutions

LICAL


The International joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence The Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence





Planning: The Canonical View

Problem Specification



PLANNER

Fully Specified Action Model

Fully Specified Goals

Completely Known (Initial) World State



Plan (Handed off for Execution)

Assumption:


- → Complete Action Descriptions
- → Fully Specified Preferences
- → All objects in the world known up front
- →One-shot planning

Allows planning to be a pure inference problem

⊗ But humans in the loop can ruin a really a perfect day ⊗

Human-in-the-Loop Planning

- In many scenarios, humans are part of the planning loop, because the planner:
 - Needs to plan to avoid them
 - Human-Aware Planning
 - Needs to provide decision support to humans
 - Because "planning" in some scenarios is too important to be left to automated planners
 - "Mixed-initiative Planning";
 "Human-Centered Planning";
 "Crowd-Sourced Planning"
 - (May need) help <u>from</u> humans
 - Mixed-initiative planning;
 "Symbiotic autonomy"
 - Needs to team with them
 - Human-robot teaming;
 Collaborative planning





Planning: The







Fully Specified

Action Model

PLANNER

Fully Specified Goals

Completely Known (Initial) World State

Plan (Handed off for Execution)

Violated Assumptions:

- → Complete Action Descriptions (Split knowledge)
- → Fully Specified Preferences (uncertain users)
- → Packaged planning problem (Plan Recognition)
- →One-shot planning (continual revision)

Planning is no longer a pure inference problem 😕

⊗ But humans in the loop can ruin a really a perfect day ⊗





Human-in-the-Loop Planning & Decision Support

AAAI 2015 Tutorial

rakaposhi.eas.asu.edu/hilp-tutorial

Subbarao Kambhampati

Arizona State University

Kartik Talamadupula


IBM T.J. Watson Research Center



Funding from ONR, ARO and NSF gratefully acknowledged ¹







Materials

Tutorial Slides (Final version, as given) [PDF]

Challenges in Human-in-the-loop Planning

- Interpret what humans are doing based on incomplete human and domain models (Modeling)
 - Plan/goal/intent recognition
- Plan with incomplete domain models (Decision Making)
 - Robust planning/execution support with "lite" models
 - Proactive teaming support
- Explanations/Excuses (Interaction/Communication)
 - How should the human and robot coordinate
- Understand effective interactions between humans and machines (Evaluation)
 - Human factor study

Planning for Human-Robot Teaming

Problem Specification 1

Open World Goals

- When to start sensina?
 - > Indicator to start sensing
- What to look for?
 - Object type
 - Object properties



- When to stop sensing?
 - > When does the planner know the world is closed?
- > Why should the robot sense?
 - > Does the object fulfill a goal?
 - > What is the reward? Is it a bonus?

Talamadupula, Benton et al., ACM TIST 2010

Planning for

Replanning for Changing Worlds

- New Information
 - Sensors
 - Human teammate
- New Goals
 - Orders: Humans
 - Requests
- Requirement
 - > New plan that works in new world (state)
 - Achieves the changed goals

Problem Updates

[TIST I 0]

Info loop?

Assim When is a plan "Explainable" to the human in the

- · The robot generates its plan of action using its model MR
- · The human "interprets" this plan in light of her understanding of the Robot's model M*
- M_p and M^{*}_p can be quite different..
- Differences can be a result of:
 - ⋄ Different capabilities (e.g., possible
 - ♦ Different knowledge (e.g., level of modeling)
 - Different interpretation of behaviors (e.g., plans) interacting with the world -- more than just trajectory





 $\operatorname{argmin} cost(\pi_{M_R}) + \alpha \cdot dist(\pi_{M_R}, \pi_{\mathcal{M}_R^*})$

But, alas, M*_R is not known!



Model Updates (via natural language)

- "To go into a room when you are at a closed door, push it one meter.'
 - > Precondition: "you are at a closed
 - > Action definition: "push it one meter'
 - > Effect: "go into a room"

NLP Module

- Reference resolution
- Parsing
- Background knowledge
- Action submission (to planner)





[In collaboration with hrilab, Tufts University]

Talamadupula et al. AAAI10]

[Cantrell, Talamadupula et al., HRI 2012]

Interpretable Al... (Symbols/Neurons Redux)

- We humans may be made of neurons, but we seem to care a "lot" about comprehensibility and "explanations"
- If we want AI systems to work with us, they better handle this
 - This is an important challenge for the neural architectures
 - What do those middle layers represent?
 - Hinton says that (eventually?) we can just connect them to language generator networks and in effect "ask them"..


Spock or Kirk?: Should Al have emotions?

- By dubbing "acting rational" as the definition of AI, we carefully separated the AI enterprise from "psychology", "cognitive science" etc.
- But pursuit of HAAI pushes us right back into these disciplines (and more)
 - Making an interface that improves interaction with humans requires understanding of human psychology..
 - E.g. studies showing how programs that have even a rudimentary understanding of human emotions fare much better in interactions with humans





Do we really know what (sort of assistance) humans want?



We dance round in a ring and suppose,

But the Secret sits in the middle and knows.

Proactive Help Can be Disconcerting!




Human-human Teaming Analysis in Urban Search and Rescue

Simulated search task (Minecraft) with human playing role of USAR robot


- 20 internal/external dyads tested
- Conditions of autonomous/intelligent or remotely controlled robot
- Differences in SA, performance, and communications



Thursday January 31, 2013







Musk, Wozniak and Hawking urge ban on warfare AI and autonomous weapons

More than 1,000 experts and leading robotics researchers sign open letter warning of military artificial intelligence arms race



Netflix's Hastings: Battle for machines and genetically m

CHRIS O'BRIEN IANUARY 18, 2016 3:41 AM



∾ Oscar Wilde ∾

in between

that went

from barbarism to decadence

> AI is the only tec from disappoint ent to without touching beneficia


es the key to hizing other

Artificial Intelligence

and


Technological Unemployment

recent lecture will be broadcast next week, does not think that will happen soon.



BBC News >





has come a long way since Hastings got his masters from Stanford University 1988. But he still follows developments in the field closely. And during a conversation on stage today at the DLD Conference in Munich, Germany, lastings said he was far less worried about looming threats of an Al-triggered ocalypse than are many other observers, such as Tesla's Elon Musk.

Some people worry about what happens when machine intelligence is too strong," Hastings said. "That's like worrying about our Mars colony and people







Space Act Agreement with NASA Ames Research Center


















Why we don't need to overworry...

Captain America to the Rescue?





Why we don't need to over-worry...

- We already have autonomous systems; making them intelligent can't be bad!
- We get to design Al—we don't need to imbue them with the same survival instincts
- The way to handle possible problems with Al are to allow multiple Als
- Technological unemployment is a big concern...
 - ..but even here, the opinion is divided
 - "biased advantages" vs. "rising tide lifts all boats"

Suppose Evil AI is right around the corner.. How do we stop it?

- What wont work
 - Renunciation
 - Tight regulation
 - Fierce internal programming
- What works?
 - More Al!



It is called Competition.


If you fear a super smart, Skynet level AI getting too clever for us and running out of control, then give it rivals who are just as smart but who have a vested interest in preventing any one AI entity from becoming a would-be God.

It is how the American Founders used constitutional checks and balances to prevent runaway power grabs by our own leaders, for the first time in the history of varied human civilizations. It is how companies prevent market warping monopoly, that is when markets are truly kept flat-open-fair.

Alas, this is a possibility almost never portrayed in Hollywood sci fi – except on the brilliant show Person of Interest – wherein equally brilliant computers stymie each other and this competition winds up saving humanity.

Al & Unemployment:

If machines can do
Everything that people
can, then what will
people do?



Al & Unemployment

- Taxi Drivers
- Factory workers
- Journalists
- Doctors (??)
- Cocktail Waiter




Technology

Intelligent Machines: The jobs robots will steal first


By Jane Wakefield Technology reporter

① 14 September 2015 | Technology



The many good things AI can bring to the society

- Assistive technologies
 - Elder care; care for the disabled;
 - cognitive orthotics
 - Personal Digital Assistants
 - ("Not Eric Schmidt")
- Accident free driving...
- Increased support for diversity
 - Language translation technologies (real life Babel Fish!)
- ... <many many others>



Summary

- What is Intelligence
- Progress of Al
- The pendulum swings in Al
 - Symbols Neurons
 - Logic -- Probability
 - Replace Augment
 - Spock –Kirk
 - Disappointment Doomsday



The Fundamental Questions Facing Our Age


- Origin of the Universe
- Origin of Life
- Nature of Intelligence





"To know your future you must know your past"

Predictions are hard, especially about the future



CSE 471/598 Lecture Notes (Spring 2012)

Current Offering: Fall 2015; Friday 1:30PM--4PM. LSE 106

****Here is the Class Schedule with Videos for Fall 2015 Offering****

Piazza site for Fall 2015 Offering

Additional pointers:

Google "rao ai"

- Check out what students say about the last offering of this course in CEAS student evaluations.
- · Check out what students "learned" from the last offering of this course (in their own words).
- . Intro: Intelligent agent design [R&N Ch 1, Ch 2] (sound).
 - L1 [Jan 5, 2012] Video (~4gig) and Audio of the lecture. Administrivia; the space odyssey son et lumeire; Using it as a vehicle to do an interactive overview of AI developments; Definitions of AI--and why thinking humanly, thinking rationally and acting humanly do not quite provide the right fit as general definitions for AI
 - L2 [Jan 10, 2012] Video (~4gig) and Audio of the lecture. Rational agency; performance metrics; percept/action/goal/environment types; agent designs and how they motivate the course topics.
- Atomic (Problem Solving) Agents [R&N Ch 3 3.1--3.5]
 - L3 [Jan 12, 2012] Video (~4gig) and Audio of the lecture. Atomic,







propositional and relational representations--their tradeoffs (and how functions can allow representation of infinite state spaces compactly.). Atomic agent design. How search is at the heart--and child-generator, goal-test functions are needed. Blind vs. Informed search. Before continuing to single state search algorithms, thinking of the effect of environment accessibility. Multiple-initial state search or belief-state search. Without sensing (conformant planning) and with sensing (contingent planning; the medicate problem).

- L4 [Jan 17, 2012] Video (~4gig) and Audio of the lecture. Exploration/exploitation tradeoffs. Setting statespaces for atomic agents. Search for single-state atomic agents. World state vs. Search node difference. Viewing search algorithms in terms of their queuing functions. Dept-First/Breadth-first searches and how they differ in optimiality vs. space consumption.
- o L5 [Jan 19, 2012] Video (~4gig) and Audio of the lecture. A discussion of the uniform search tree model. A slow and comprehensive discussion of blind search strategies BFS, DFS, Depth limited DFS and IDDFS and their tradeoffs. A discussion on graph vs. tree search. A discussion on handling duplicate expansions with closed list vs. ancestor checking.
- Informed Search
 - L6 [Jan 20, 2012; for the class of 1/24] Video (~2.5 gig).





